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It is argued that both the “Free Will Theorem” (FWT) and the “relativistic GRW model with
flash ontology” (rGRWf) hiddenly assume the before-before experiment’s result, and for this reason
both FWT and rGRWf imply free will in the world outside free experimenters.
The Free Will Theorem of John Conway and Simon
Kochen [1] assumes that experimenters are capable of
freely choosing measurement settings. The theorem ba-
sically states that this assumption of free will “in the
particles inside ourselves“ and the experimental violation
of Bell’s inequality together imply free will also in “the
particles all over the universe”.
In more technical terms, what the authors of the FWT
mainly claimed in the first version of their theorem is:
Freedom+Bell + determinism ⇒ contradiction (1)
Where:
Freedom means the supposed capacity of experimental-
ist A of choosing his measurement settings independently
of the choices done by his colleague experimentalist B.
Bell means experiments demonstrating violation of
Bell inequalities [2].
Determinism means that the outcome of an experi-
ment is determined by the information accessible to the
particles from the past (temporal causality).
Statement (1) was first questioned by Roderich Tu-
mulka [3]. Without entering into the (undoubtedly im-
portant) subtleties of his formulations, what Tumulka
states is that Bell experiments do not imply (1) but
rather:
Freedom+Bell + locality ⇒ contradiction (2)
In other words, the failure of determinism does not nec-
essarily follow from Bell experiments.
In the modified stronger version of their theorem Con-
way and Kochen state [4]:
Freedom+Bell + covariant deterministic dynamics
⇒ contradiction (3)
and:
Freedom+Bell + covariant stochastic dynamics
⇒ contradiction (4)
Where:
Covariant dynamics refers to events that are related
to each other through only covariant or Lorentzinvariant
(relativistic) links. If these events are locally determinis-
tic one has a covariant deterministic model, and if they
are locally random a covariant stochastic one.
Regarding statement (3) Tumulka and co-authors, and
also other authors, claim that it is not new [5, 6], but is
nothing other that Bell’s theorem otherwise formulated.
(It seems to me that [7] actually provides a simple and
elegant proof of (3)).
By contrast, Tumulka and co-authors consider state-
ment (4) wrong. To prove this they give an explicit
model called “relativistic GRW model with flash ontol-
ogy”, (rGRWf) which according to the authors is stochas-
tic and covariant [5].
In a recent comment Nicolas Gisin nicely illustrates
that the origin of this somewhat confused dispute lies in
very different understanding of what a “covariant quan-
tum process” is. Gisin stresses that in rGRWf the events
that happen (each single pair of flashes fA, fB) cannot be
covariant. Covariant is only the “cloud of future events”
(i.e. the probability distribution). Therefore, in some
sense, both [4] and [5] are correct: while Tumulka and
co-authors “correctly insist that rGRWf is as covariant
as possible”, Conway and Kochen “correctly stress that
it is not more covariant than possible”[6].
The aim of my Comment is to show, firstly, that if the
content of FWT reduces to statement (3), then the theo-
rem does not deserve the name of “free will”, for it does
not exclude non-local determinism. Additionally, I show
regarding (4) that by declaring Flash Ontology (rGRWf)
covariant Tumulka and co-authors implicitly assume the
result of the before-before (Suarez-Scarani) experiment
[8–10].
Indeed statement (3) implies only the failure of lo-
cal determinism. It is however possible to construct a
Suarez-Scarani model that is both non-local and deter-
ministic, i.e., each event is determined by the information
accessible from the past although in a non-covariant way
[11]. We remind that the Suarez-Scarani model consid-
ers relativistic experiments with beam-splitters in mo-
tion in such a way that each of them, in its own refer-
ence frame, is first to select the output of the photons
(before-before timing). Then, each outcome becomes in-
dependent of the other, and the nonlocal correlations
2should disappear [8, 9]. Such a non-local model assumes
time-ordered non-covariant influences, and if one com-
bines it with local determinism one obtains a nonlocal
full-deterministic (temporal causal) model. For before-
before timing the model predicts disappearance of non-
local correlations with maintenance of possible local ones
[12], and does not entail signaling [13]. Suarez-Scarani
models have been experimentally tested and refuted [10].
Consequently, a more appropriate version of the Free
Will theorem would be:
Freedom+ Suarez&Scarani + determinism
⇒ contradiction (5)
In any case, (5) excludes more determinism, and thereby
allows for more free will than (1) and (3).
We turn now to statement (4): How is it possible that
Tumulka and co-authors claim that the Flash Ontology is
covariant [5] (and not only “as covariant as possible” like
Gisin suggests [6])? It seems to me that the reason for
this claim is hidden in the following Tumulka’s statement
in [3]: “The objective facts are where-when the flashes
occur, and it is enough if a theory prescribes, as does
rGRWf, their joint distribution in a Lorentzinvariant way.
Whether nature chooses the space-time point fB first,
and fA afterwards, or the other way around, does not
seem like a meaningful question to me.”
As said above, it is possible to construct a testable, and
hence physically “meaningfull” model assuming time-
ordered links between space-like separated events. Thus
the question Tumulka refers to is clearly “meaningful”,
and he himself is wrong. Yet the before-before experi-
ment proves Suarez-Scarani models wrong and demon-
strates that nature does the correlations dismissing any
time order. In this sense Tumulka is right: On the one
hand, if the time order does not exist, then each single
pair of flashes (fB,fA) can be considered a single event
coming from outside space-time, and the concept of co-
variance does not apply. On the other hand, there where
this concept makes sense, the model is covariant. In con-
clusion, it is before-before experiment which makes Flash
Ontology covariant.
But there is something more. Demonstrating local
randomness alone, though it suffices to refute determin-
ism, it is not yet enough to prove “free will”. Indeed
anyone who believes to share “this valuable commodity”
will certainly expect to be able of controlling surround-
ing randomness to some extent. Now the before-before
experiment demonstrates effects in which control of quan-
tum randomness happens from outside space-time, and
in this sense it can also be considered an experimental
proof of free will on the part of nature (provided there is
free will in our brains!) [14]. But this also means that
Flash Ontology implies free will since it assumes corre-
lated ”flashes“ that cannot be explained by any history
in space-time.
In conclusion, no experiment can prove “the free will of
the experimenter”. But if one assumes this free will, then
the before-before experiment demonstrates free will also
in the world outside the experimenter. Since the FWT
and the rGRWf Flash Ontology implicitly assume the
before-before experiment, both descriptions imply free
will in “the particles all over the universe” and, in this
respect, FWT and the rGRWf are equivalent.
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